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SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS IN CIVIL,
CRIMINAL, AND SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan*
103 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017)
Settlement is more likely if parties are free to set its terms, including a
promise that these terms will remain secret between them. State sunshinein-litigation laws work to defeat this incentive for confidentiality in order to
protect third parties from otherwise unknown hazards. The intuition is that
a wrongdoer should not be able to pay one plaintiff for silence at the
expense of other victims. This Article begins by showing that the intuition is
often wrong or overstated. A plaintiff who can assess defendant’s
vulnerability to future claims can extract a large enough settlement to
provide substantial deterrence, and at much lower cost to the legal system.
The argument does not transfer well to most criminal cases, where the
defendant might pay not to avoid other claims but to avoid incarceration,
which offers no direct benefit to the settling victim. It is further complicated
in sexual assault cases, where the plaintiff might settle too quickly in order
to protect her privacy. The discussion works toward the idea that in some
settings semi-confidentiality – the disclosure of the substance of settlement
but not the magnitude of monetary payments – is superior to both secrecy
and transparency. The right amount of confidentiality is a function of the
parties’ interest in privacy, the likelihood that the wrongdoing is part of a
pattern unknown to the settling plaintiff, and the accuracy of the litigation
process that settlement seeks to bypass. We are able to identify cases where
law ought to allow (even) criminal cases to be settled privately and
confidentially, and also cases where even sexual assault victims should be
steered away from confidential settlement and toward translucency.

*
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ADJUDICATION ACCURACY
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
To the extent that law is a public good, settlements, and for that matter
any failure to pursue legitimate claims to trial and then all the way through
an appeals process, are troubling. On the one hand, settlements and private
arbitration proceedings can save costs, and so long as they are reached in
the shadow of the law, they can accomplish most of what law aims to do.
There is ample evidence that law not only respects parties’ liberty to settle
disputes but also encourages settlement.1 Where it does not, it must
recognize that parties can often come to an agreement before any legal
claim is filed, and thus preempt law’s involvement. Either way, settlements
deprive the world of information that judicial decisions might convey and,
where settlement is secret, third parties may not even know of hazards or
facts that are known to the settling parties but costly for others to
rediscover.2 Put this way, a part of our conclusion is already foreshadowed:
it is sensible for law to allow some private settlements, but it is also prudent
to put some constraints on confidentiality. But there is a countervailing
element. When a party seeks to settle a matter in confidence, its
counterparty can often extract a price that serves third-party interests. This
novel point suggests that there are cases where law, counter-intuitively,
1

See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and
Why Permit Non-party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221
(2000).
2
For the classic and wild position against settlement, in favor of more and
more due process and judicial decisions, and by implication against turning the
other cheek, see Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984).
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ought to allow or even welcome confidential agreements to settle disputes –
even where the matter arises because one of the parties is a serious and
repeat wrongdoer. Deterrence may be obtained in place of (sunshine as a)
disinfectant. Information is valuable, to be sure, but the higher price a party
pays for secrecy might deter misbehavior as successfully as any legal
remedy, and the latter normally comes at greater social cost. For example,
this Article argues that an employer who catches an embezzling employee
might be allowed to accept payments from the employee in return for not
calling in the police. Similarly, but less controversially, an injured party can
and should often be able to extract a larger settlement from a tortfeasor in
return for confidentiality. Where a state’s “sunshine-in-litigation law”
stands in the way,3 it ought to be modified to provide for semiconfidentiality, or revelation of the subject matter but not the precise terms
of settlement. A much harder question is whether the accused party in a
university’s sexual assault disciplinary case ought to be able to bargain with
the accuser to avoid the risk of expulsion from the university. When does a
case belong to the victim – and how might a victim’s ability to extract
payment for confidentiality advance the goals of the legal system?
A useful thought experiment is to imagine and compare legal systems
that choose among the following rules: (1) The frequency and
confidentiality of settlement, including arbitration proceedings, is entirely in
the litigants’ hands; (2) Confidentiality is restricted by courts or by statutory
sunshine (in litigation) laws that require revelation of obvious hazards, like
dangerous consumer products and intentional wrongdoers; and (3)
Nonpublic dispute resolution is permitted, but taxed – perhaps by legislating
that payments made as part of completely confidential settlements are
nondeductible. Finally, though the list could be longer, there is the
possibility that: (4) Confidentiality is normally respected as to the amount
of a settlement, but not its subject matter. The first two of these options are
prevalent, but this Article suggests that the last two – one presently
unknown and the other barely known4 – are probably superior.
Part I develops the idea that confidentiality can promote deterrence, and
that state sunshine-in-litigation laws may be misguided. Part II considers
whether confidentiality can ever be desirable in criminal matters, where the
criminal might pay the victim to avoid incarceration. Part III assesses the
problem of false claims when victims are paid for confidentiality and can
3

Florida was the first of some twenty states to prohibit confidentiality
agreements that bring about the concealment of public hazards “that [have] caused
and [are] likely to cause injury.” Fla. Stat. Ann. 69.081 (2016).
4
See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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therefore collect more than their losses. Part IV then applies the insights
about deterrence and false claims to sexual assault cases decided on
university campuses under the rules encouraged by the Department of
Education. The discussion then turns in Part V to the advantages of semiconfidentiality. Third-party interests might be served even as wrongdoers
are somewhat deterred by paying for translucency – secrecy with respect to
the amount of a settlement but transparency as to its substance. Part VI
generalizes the problem and describes the parameters of an optimal
confidentiality rule.
I. IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS OF CIVIL
LAWSUITS?
A. Deterrence and the Price of Confidentiality
Why do defendants often seek confidentiality? At first blush it seems
that a wrongdoing defendant and a willing, self-interested, knowledgeable
plaintiff can collude to keep valuable information from other victims, and in
the process compromise the deterrence function of law. In the case where a
wrongdoer is a tortfeasor who may have injured a number of victims, a
promise of confidentiality elicited from one settling victim might allow this
defendant to continue to misbehave; the wrongdoer is under-deterred
because, by hypothesis, similarly situated victims will not know that they
can bring suits. The straightforward idea is that the public ought to know of
dangers, and defendants must be deterred from repeat wrongdoing. The
prospect of imitative, multiple lawsuits or judicially supervised class actions
serves this purpose.
Note that the presence of a disadvantaged, ill-informed third-party is not
normally enough to make a good case against confidentiality. The same
defendant might also have breached a contract with a vendor, and then
negotiated a payment to avoid suit by the disappointed vendor. Other
vendors may benefit from knowledge of this breach and settlement,5 but
there is no requirement of disclosure. If the breaching party fears some
reputational loss, it can ask for a confidentiality clause. Courts will respect
and facilitate this agreement; if the vendor is found to have revealed the
terms of settlement after agreeing to confidentiality, it may be forced by the
terms of the clause to disgorge some or all of the compensation it received

5

We call it a settlement whether or not it was preceded by the formal filing of
a claim for breach of contract.
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for the contractual breach.6 Such confidentiality agreements are more
common in tort cases than in contract cases, but in both settings courts will
likely refer to the “public policy in favor of settlement.”7
When settlement involves filed tort claims, some jurisdictions bar
confidentiality if it will cover up information that is likely to help other
people avoid serious injury.8 Possible modification of these sunshine-inlitigation statutes is discussed in Parts IV and V. The statutes might also be
motivated by the fear that likely defendants will know they can settle claims
confidentially and therefore be under-deterred from taking proper
precautions in the first place.
Closer analysis shows, however, that the connection between
confidential settlements and the deterrence of antisocial behavior is more
complicated. Confidentiality may, counterintuitively, enhance deterrence, or
at least be inconsequential. Imagine, for example, that consumer A is
injured by manufacturer M’s product, and suffers a loss of 100. A claims
that the product was defective. There is the possibility that 999 other
consumers are similarly injured. An open trial pitting A against M, or a
transparent settlement between the parties, will enable these other victims to
bring claims against M. M’s total liability will be 100,000, an accurate
reflection of the harm caused by M and, ex ante, the right amount to
guarantee that M, and other manufacturers, will be properly deterred in the
first place. Absent information about the A-M lawsuit and settlement, these
other injured consumers may not know that their injuries were caused by
M’s product or they may not know that the product is defective. The former
seems plausible where, for example, a drug produced by M engenders a side

6

See, e.g., Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay, 137 So.3d 1045, 3d Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. (2014) (breach of settlement’s confidentiality provision requires partial
disgorgement of proceeds).
7
See Hinshaw, et al. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. App. 4th 233 (1996). More
generally, a presumption of liberty to contract allows a seller to make an offer
conditional on confidentiality even though third parties suffer increased search
costs.
8
Fla. Stat. Ann. 69.081 (2016) (courts prohibited from entering orders or
judgments that conceal public hazards; contracts that prohibit disclosure of public
hazards against public policy and not enforceable); Ar. Code § 16-55-122 (2015)
(contracts that prohibit disclosure of public hazards against public policy and not
enforceable); La. Code Civ. Pro. 1426(D) (same); Wa. Rev. Code 4.24.611 (2016)
(confidentially provisions subject to a balancing test that must consider public
hazards).
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effect that is not generally known to be associated with M’s drug. 9 M is
therefore eager to attach a confidentiality clause to the settlement with A in
order to avoid further liability of 99,900. Confidentiality in this case seems
socially undesirable.
The preceding analysis, with its conventional conclusion, ignores A’s
likely behavior, or bargaining ability, once A perceives that M values
confidentiality. A, or A’s experienced attorney, should in principle demand
close to 100,000 in return for the confidentiality clause. If A can extract that
entire benefit from M, then M is properly deterred, just as if M expected to
pay damages to all 1,000 injured consumers.10 Indeed, the confidentiality
provision may even be socially efficient because it obviates numerous
lawsuits between M and other victims. To be sure, these other victims, who
by hypothesis do not know to sue M, go uncompensated and may waste
resources searching for the source of their injuries. But the central point is
that a confidential agreement between M and A surely does not entirely let
M escape the consequences of its actions, and may even deter M as well as
any other tort-and-settlement regime. The key element here is that A
perceives the value of confidentiality to M, and can extract roughly the
same total payments M would have paid to other injured parties with good
claims.
There are several important deficiencies in this optimistic story, and
these shortcomings may explain why judicial decisions, legislative histories,
and academic commentary have failed to notice or come to grips with this
9

In principle, adverse side effects must be reported under 21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
However, reporting depends on the ability of patients and physicians to draw a
connection between a side-effect and the drug, and then some determination that
the reported incident is plausibly traced to the drug. When a company fails to
report an adverse drug experience (such as when it secretly settles a case), the FDA
will pursue advisory action (such as issuing a warning letter), judicial action
(including injunctions, civil damages, and criminal prosecutions), or administrative
action (such as withdrawing drug approval or barring the company from
submitting any future drug applications). See Stuart L. Friedel and Joseph A. Sena
Jr., Pharma Challenges: Adverse Event Reporting and Social Media, Oct. 26,
2012, BLOOMBERG BNA, https://www.bna.com/pharma-challenges-adverse-eventreporting-and-social-media/, accessed Jan. 7, 2017.
10
More precisely, knowing that A or another plaintiff will extract such a
payment for confidentiality, encourages M to take greater precautions at the outset.
M knows that it is costly to pay out 1,000 claims, but it can be just as costly to pay
one claim enhanced by a huge premium for the confidentiality thought necessary to
suppress the other claims. M will take into account the probability of at least one
informed plaintiff filing suit.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921059

21-Feb-17]

SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

7

defense of confidential settlements. A, and even M, cannot be certain that
other victims require the information provided by the settlement.
Confidentiality is worth less to M (and therefore to A) the more other
claimants will discover M’s legal vulnerability without knowledge of the AM settlement. If, for example, G is injured because of a toy made by T, it is
hard to see how other injured families require knowledge of the G-T
agreement in order to identify T as the cause of their losses. The source of a
child’s injury will be obvious. In the wake of another child’s injury, that
family will easily develop a theory of the case resembling that which
brought G to file a claim and then to settle with T. Potential claimants
probably still gain something from knowledge of a G-T settlement; the
dollar amount of that settlement, combined with information they may be
able to obtain about the severity of G’s injuries, reveals something about
T’s eagerness to avoid trial or T’s prediction as to whether its toy will be
found defective. To the extent that these arguments suggest that confidential
settlements are at times poor substitutes for trials, they also show that
confidentiality may not be terribly valuable to M. In turn, legal intervention
against confidential agreements in these circumstances is of little value.
In other cases, as where A is convinced that his automobile
malfunctioned and caused an accident, it is more likely that confidentiality
is of value to M. Confidentiality will prevent wasteful strike suits from
other consumers and lower M’s costs – especially when A is unable to
assess the extent to which the malfunction is a one-off event or something
that other consumers would wish to know.11 On the other hand, if the
malfunction is real and widespread, M can take precautionary steps going
forward – and M knows that other injuries will generate other plaintiffs.
There is probably a spectrum across which confidentiality is more valuable
to M as other claimants gain more from knowledge of an A-M settlement. It
might be appropriate to say that there is an information asymmetry driving
M’s preference for confidentiality, but this deemphasizes both A’s ability
extract to value from the better-informed M as that asymmetry narrows, and
the likelihood that such settlements come close to deterring M in reasonable
fashion.

11

Public agreements reveal information that can be leveraged in future strike
suit negotiations, including a party’s propensity to settle. Although defendants can
discourage strike suits by litigating more often, pursuing this strategy is wasteful.
Note that secrecy and a settlement with A might also keep other consumers from
duplicating A’s investigation and litigation costs, but again the question at this
point in the discussion is whether A can extract, from M, a large part of the value
of secrecy.
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Even where confidentiality is very valuable to M, the parties will not
normally know how many claims like A’s are forthcoming. A might have
enough data to estimate that M faces 100,000 in liability because of the
likelihood of side effects from its drug, but when A tries to extract
something close to this sum in return for A’s promise of silence, M will
reason that there are a number of people in A’s situation, and M must find it
worthwhile to buy silence from all of them. M might pay up to 9,000 to
each of ten knowledgeable victims in return for confidentiality, but M will
not pay much more than that, and A (and even perhaps M) does not know
how many ways the pot is to be divided in negotiations with M.
Significantly – though again surprisingly absent from the settlement
literature is the observation that – a confidentiality clause loses value when
M is paying off a number of victims. The clause will provide that if A
breaks the agreement, A must return the settlement amount, and courts can
be expected to uphold this contract.12 But what if both A and B
independently extract settlements from M by agreeing to confidentiality,
and then B blurts? B certainly forfeits his settlement, but it is unlikely that
A will have agreed to a settlement that requires A to refund her settlement if
B breaks his agreement with M. We have not seen such an agreement,
calling for the return of settlement money when another party breaches a
separate confidentiality agreement, and if there were such a contract it is
possible that courts would not enforce it against A. Moreover, as M divides
the gains from confidentiality among several informed plaintiffs, like A and
B, each has diminished financial incentive to uphold the confidentiality
agreement. Again, this makes confidentiality less valuable to M, and
therefore to all the parties. In turn, it becomes less clear whether payments
for confidentiality provide the same deterrence as those required in
numerous lawsuits or in a class action on behalf of those similarly situated
to A. Sunshine laws or refusals to enforce confidentiality agreements can
thus be understood as means of ensuring the appropriate level of deterrence.
Of course, the overall effect may be to discourage settlement, if M would
rather go to trial than to settle transparently. In turn, deterrence is a function
of plaintiffs’ ability to get to court and prevail in trials.
Although sunshine-in-litigation laws appear to be motivated by the fear
that confidentiality will allow M to harm new victims, the better case for
transparency is probably based on the second idea noted above, the level of
deterrence. It seems unlikely that even with confidentiality M will continue
to manufacture dangerous products or allow them to continue to circulate,
12

Note that M might collude with B to blurt when M no longer values the
confidentiality agreed to by A. Courts might take this into account when evaluating
confidentiality agreements.
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because every future injury creates a new claimant who may trace the
problem to M without knowledge of A’s lawsuit or settlement. In most
cases, once M is informed of a hazard because of a lawsuit filed by A, M
will evaluate the risk and, when appropriate, alter its product, issue a recall,
or at least warn potential victims, because the precaution is less expensive
than potential liability from further injuries that might be avoided. There are
two kinds of cases in which this optimism is unsupported. The first is where
M thinks that no one but A will see the connection A has made between the
injury and M. A side effect of a pharmaceutical seems like the best
example, although as a practical matter M is obligated by statute to report
side effects and bad outcomes that come to its attention, and the penalty for
noncompliant secrecy is high.13
The second category is where M does not believe that it has made a
defective product,14 or that A’s injury truly derives from M’s product, but
M fears that news of A’s claim will bring forth other claimants who also,
but incorrectly, trace their injuries, real or imagined, to M. In these cases, M
may settle with A because M fears irrationality and error within the legal
system. M may also fear a disproportionate cost to its reputation. Thus,
imagine a case in which A claims a side effect from a vaccine or from
power lines made or installed by M, even though there is overwhelming
scientific evidence against the causal link claimed by A. M might pay A,
subject to a confidentiality agreement, even though M thinks the claim
baseless.
B. Pattern Recognition and Confidentiality

13

21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (detailing the Food and Drug Administration’s reporting
requirements for adverse reactions to approved drugs). Depending on the
circumstances of the reporting, the FDA might issue a warning at its discretion, or
pursue legal action. Alternatively, a third party can take legal action. For example,
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer initiated a civil suit under state consumer
protection laws against Glaxosmithkline for allegedly failing to disclose studies
regarding the side effects of the drug Paxil, leading to fines of $3 billion. Kaitie
Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud
Settlement,
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
July
2,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3billion-in-fraud-settlement.html, accessed Jan. 6, 2017.
14
Even M thinks there is a defect, it might be of the kind that does not appear
in all identical products. A few items on an assembly line might suffer from metal
fatigue, or develop cracks, while the others are just fine.
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In some cases, plaintiff is at a bargaining disadvantage because it is
difficult to assess defendant’s exposure. Imagine that a celebrity, C,
sexually assaults W. W brings a civil suit15 and C offers a settlement
conditional on confidentiality. W does not know whether the value of a
confidentiality agreement derives from the potential loss to C’s reputation
or whether C also has reason to fear that other complainants will come
forward once they learn that their own experiences might be part of a
pattern of sexual misbehavior. In contrast, A, the conventional tort victim,
was able to assess M’s exposure by analyzing its sales volume and
bargaining for a confidential settlement that approaches the full deterrence
value of claims against M in a transparent world. But W knows
comparatively less than A, and C surely knows more about the existence of
other complainants than does his accuser, W. The accused celebrity, C,
might reason that others do not want to suffer the costs of coming forward if
their chances of success are low. C, however, knows that if a number of
women come forward, each is more likely to be believed, and then to suffer
lower costs. In short, W can extract some payment from C, but without
information about whether C is in fact a serial wrongdoer, W is often unable
to extract a high settlement. In turn, C, and others like him, is insufficiently
deterred.
The preceding intuitions about deterrence and pattern recognition are
encouraged by asking what law’s response is and should be to private
settlements of claims where there is no special pattern problem. In the civil
context, one-off cases do not normally cause defendants to offer anything
for confidentiality. Setting aside cases where there is a privacy interest, it is
the pattern potential that makes the information valuable to others and
costly to the settling party. In criminal cases, and perhaps with respect to
most intentional torts, there is more of a sense of bad types and good types.
The legal system gathers information about prior arrests and convictions
because it finds the information useful; private settlements may be
particularly undesirable.
II. PRIVATE SETTLING OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING
Imagine that a storekeeper, S, suffers an armed robbery at the hands of
AR. S is prepared to call the police and show incontrovertible video
evidence, but AR, discovering that the robbery was filmed by a hidden
camera, contacts S or even returns to discuss matters and offers $5,000 to
15

The lack of evidence may have convinced W that no criminal prosecution
would succeed. Alternatively, the statute of limitations for a criminal suit, but not
for a civil suit, may have been tolled.
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settle the matter if S will agree to complete confidentiality. Most legal
systems assign a monopoly power over criminal law to the state, so that the
nascent criminal complaint might not seem like something that S can settle,
but it can be difficult for the state to learn of a crime or to obtain a
conviction without S’s (uncompensated) cooperation and then testimony at
trial. As a matter of legal doctrine, if S extracts a payment much greater
than the value of what AR has taken, S runs a risk, albeit more in theory
than in practice, that he will be open to a charge of extortion for having
taken more than his “claim of right” allowed.16 The doctrine seems aimed at
cases where the victim of a theft tracks down the thief and repossesses his
belongings. If the victim enters the thief’s property, for instance, the former
cannot take for himself as many things as he likes, and if he does so he is a
thief or robber himself.
In practice, if the armed robber and storekeeper bargain for a payment in
return for a confidentiality agreement, law’s problem is more likely to be
the under-deterrence of the robber than the storekeeper’s enrichment or
“crime” of extortion, and especially so if AR initiates the bargain. Put in
terms of deterrence, S’s ability to extract a settlement from AR is thought to
be insufficient to deter AR in optimal fashion inasmuch as S does not
internalize the cost of future robberies by AR. This feature of criminal or
intentional wrongdoing is not new. In the legal code found in Exodus, both
intentional wrongs and negligence generate remedies, but only the penalties
set down for negligence are described as avoidable through settlement
between the private parties. For example, when an ox that was known by its
owner to have gored and caused injury on a previous occasion gores again
and kills a human, the penalty applied to the owner who failed to restrain
his animal is severe, but the family of the victim could accept monetary

16

See generally, Annotation, Robbery, Attempted Robbery, or Assault to
Commit Robbery, as Affected by the Intent to Collect or Secure Debt or Claim, 88
ALR 3D 1309 (1978) (when acting within a claim of right, the one who takes lacks
the intent to steal). The discussion here assumes that the same is true for extortion
rather than behavior that looks like a robbery. A criminal claim against S seems
especially unlikely where AR initiates the private bargain, as it become hard to
describe S as an extortionist. Finally, if AR promises future payment, or S accepts
payment and then later decides to report AR to the police, there is the question
whether law will enforce the AR-S contract. It is easy to imagine a refusal to
enforce, as refusal falls far short of labeling S a criminal. On the other hand,
nonenforcement in the event of breach rewards S, though it is likely to deter a
subset of these private settlements in the future.
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payment in lieu of the remedy provided by law.17 Similarly, in
Hammurabi’s Code, when a new house constructed by a builder fell in and
killed someone, the legislated “eye for an eye” approach was apparently and
widely avoided by negotiated payment.18 In contrast, we have no textual
statement or evidence that robbery or murder could be privately settled
under those early codes. Those wrongs are regarded as crimes against the
community, and that label may capture the idea that a criminal is likely to
strike again while the mistakes made by a builder or owner of oxen are oneoff events. An alternative explanation is that the builder and ox owner are
thought to be deterred by monetary payments, while intentional wrongdoers
are more often thought to be out of control and undeterrable except by
removal from the community. Both distinctions track the idea that an
injured party and alleged tortfeasor, like A and M, can settle their tort suit,
perhaps secretly yet still in the shadow of the legal system, but the robber
and storekeeper should not.
Another way to think of the matter is that the modern legislature has
decided to deter and punish the robber with incarceration rather than
financial assessments. With some misdemeanors, as with securities fraud,
antitrust claims, and white-collar crime more generally, the legislature or
the prosecutor offers the wrongdoer a choice between paying a fine and
imprisonment.19 Violent crimes, or perhaps simply those associated with
many low-income perpetrators, do not come with the choice.20 Given this
17

Exodus 21:28-32 (Revised English Bible). “When an ox gores a man or a
woman to death, the ox must be put to death by stoning, and its flesh is not to be
eaten; the owner of the ox will be free from liability. If, however, the ox has for
some time past been a vicious animal, and the owner had been duly warned and
has not kept it under control, and the ox kills a man or a woman, then the ox must
be stoned to death, and the owner put to death as well. If, however, the penalty is
commuted for a money payment, he must pay in redemption of his life whatever is
imposed upon him.”
18
See G. DRIVER & J. MILES, 1 THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 408 (1952),
discussed in Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity
in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TULANE L. REV. 235 (1986).
19
See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 534.040 (providing that “a fine may be levied in lieu
of imprisonment” for misdemeanors); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (providing fines or
imprisonment for securities fraud); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 (same for anti-trust violations).
20
Serious white-collar crimes are often resolved by the state’s extracting very
large penalties from wrongdoers accused of securities fraud and other such matters.
We might set these aside because the state does the extracting and there is certainly
no extra payment for confidentiality. Indeed, the large fine, or settlement, is
advertised as a deterrent to wrongdoing. But there is room to argue that these are
simply cases where the law recognizes that financial payments can deter as well as
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decision, a private party like the storekeeper should not be able to choose
for the robber that which the state has ruled out.
But there are other perspectives. Perhaps the state would offer a choice,
or would much prefer to attach financial penalties to many crimes, if only to
save on incarceration costs, but it is stymied by the fact that so many
convicted wrongdoers do not have the means to pay. The law finds it
unseemly, or politically impossible, to incarcerate the poor while allowing
more affluent wrongdoers to buy their way out of prison. It is barely
possible that the law would allow the storekeeper and robber to bargain
privately if it thought that the latter could be as effectively deterred by
monetary payments as by incarceration – so long as the ability of some
wrongdoers to pay their way out of prison is hidden from view. In any
event, it is plain that the typical robber’s financial circumstances mean that
the storekeeper will be unable to extract a high settlement. The storekeeper
might selfishly prefer a modest payment over the wrongdoer’s
incarceration, but the state’s deterrence interest requires that the storekeeper
and robber not be allowed to bargain out of sight of the law and certainly
not for some trivial amount that will fail to deter wrongdoers.
Intuitions might change in the case where the storekeeper bargains not
with a robber but with an employee, EM, who is caught embezzling. Again,
wrongdoer and victim, EM and S, bargain to avoid calling in the police and
to allow EM to continue as an employee after making amends. There are
several reasons why confidentiality-for-pay should be more acceptable in
this situation than where AR and S bargain. First, the employed embezzler
has the means to make substantial payments, and money might serve as an
efficient deterrent. Second, by continuing to employ the wrongdoer, the
storekeeper internalizes a good part of the cost and danger associated with a
serial wrongdoer whose pattern would be revealed and perhaps halted but
for the confidentiality agreement. In principle, a potential embezzler is
deterred because he knows that apprehension leads either to imprisonment
or, through bargaining, to a significant financial loss. The employer extracts
payment but also keeps the wrongdoer close at hand; he absorbs the cost of
monitoring this employee; and he will be the most likely to suffer from
further wrongdoing. If this second feature is missing, and the employer
extracts payment but discharges the employee, law must count on the
incarceration, and with much lower social cost. Law does not offer conventional
robbers a choice between making large payments and incarceration because it is
politically and morally difficult to allow the wealthy to “buy their way” out of
prison. In the case of securities fraud, there are few poor people to ruin the visual
landscape.
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deterrence provided by the payment extracted from the wrongdoer. It would
be unsurprising if it were in just such cases that law regarded the employer
as illegally extorting from the employee, though this is hard to imagine in
cases where the embezzler initiated the bargain.21
A third option is for S and EM to bargain – but to be required to report
their bargain to the state. If the problem with a confidential agreement is
that the storekeeper gives insufficient consideration to third-party interests,
then perhaps the state should be offered the opportunity to veto the private
bargain. It might normally approve the private bargain – as it does the
settlement of contract and tort claims – both because it saves the costs of
further investigation and incarceration and also because it has no good
means of forcing employers to report crimes in the first place. Law might
recognize that the employer’s extraction serves to deter embezzlers. In
theory, the state could condition its approval on the continued employment
of the wrongdoer for a period of years. This sort of servitude can create a
risk of exploitation by the employer, but at least here the employee can quit
and risk criminal charges.
Disclosure of private bargains with criminals is hard enough to
encourage and even require; an opportunity for the state to approve or veto
such private bargains is completely impractical. To make an evaluation, the
state needs to know the identity of the wrongdoer, and this identification is
an important part of what the accused will pay to avoid.22 One possibility is
for the state to permit private bargains involving first-time offenders, and to
require disclosure simply to separate repeat and one-off offenders. A firsttime wrongdoer might then pay more for nondisclosure to avoid
classification as a repeat offender, so that the system must rely on the
employer’s security concerns in order to motivate the employer to report the
transaction. Few employers want to hire serial embezzlers. The employer
may not be ready to accept payment in return for nondisclosure because the
employer wants to know if this is truly a first-time offender or because the
wrongdoer may later on have reason to reveal that the employer did not
disclose when law required disclosure.23
21

For one thing, the employer might claim that he was afraid to turn down the
embezzler’s offer. Moreover, claim of right cases always involve initiation and
action by the victim; here the alleged extortionist would be the respondent.
22
The state could promise to record for the purpose of identifying repeat
offenders, but not to use the information for other purposes. The accused would
pay to avoid this list as well.
23
The situation resembles legal attempts to combat bribery by making it a
crime on just one side of the transaction. If, for example, it is a crime to receive a
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Generally speaking, it is in victims’ self-interest to report criminal
wrongdoing to the police when there is reason to fear further harm from the
wrongdoer, where there is a decent prospect that the police will catch the
wrongdoer and law will force the return of lost property or other restitution,
or where the victim hopes to collect from an insurer. Where there is an
ongoing relationship, crimes are often unreported; an employer who
suspects or discovers low-level embezzlement or theft will often dismiss but
not report the employee. A call to the police brings on costs, and especially
so where the accused doubles down and makes a counterclaim – which law
might resolve incorrectly. In these cases the law ought to welcome private
bargains between victim and wrongdoer, as these provide more reliable
deterrence. In any event, it seems clear that what motivates the bargain
between a storekeeper and an armed robber or embezzler is objectionable;
the parties seek to substitute private profit for criminal prosecution and
incarceration.
We do not suggest that criminal law be reconfigured to allow or even
encourage private agreements between armed robbers and storekeepers.
Unlike the case of A and M’s tort settlement, victims of armed robberies are
unlikely to extract sufficiently large settlements from financially distressed
criminals. The very reason that the modern state resorts to incarceration is
likely to stand in the way of obtaining sufficient deterrence through private
extractions. On the other hand, the state has difficulty encouraging or even
compelling some victims to come forward. If it pays them directly, their
credibility is often reduced – though no one seems to object to restitution.
There will, therefore, be cases where private agreements provide more
deterrence than the criminal law and it is for this reason that the law ought
to tolerate some experimentation with private agreements in lieu of criminal
charges. The employer-embezzler case is a potential example because the
victim is in a position to internalize third-party harms. Meanwhile, the

bribe, then the bribed party must worry that the bribing party will later on report
the bribe, or threaten to do so. See infra note 41.
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claim-of-right doctrine needs rethinking.24 The more serious concern is that
the victim will collect too little to deter the wrongdoer.25
III. FALSE CLAIMS AND MORAL HAZARDS: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES
When a victim profits from the identification of a criminal, there is the
problem of moral hazard. If an employer can extract payments from an
embezzling employee, as suggested in Part II, then an employer might
wrongfully accuse an employee of embezzlement or tempt the employee by
entrusting him with bundles of cash. An unprincipled employer might have
an eye on profiting from a misstep by the employee followed by accusation
and negotiation in the shadow of the criminal law. Simple restitution, which
is what law normally provides alongside criminal punishment, avoids this
moral hazard because it does not leave the accuser better off than before the
alleged crime. It offers a reward for coming forward, because the victim
might be made whole with the help of the law, but it does not enable the
victim to earn a tidy profit.
We do not mean to put excessive weight on this moral hazard risk.
Employers who falsely accuse their employees risk counterclaims and a loss
of employee morale. There are, after all, other situations where employers
might gain from falsely accusing and then discharging an employee. For
example, an employee might be on the verge of earning an accumulated
bonus or vacation time; an employee might be paid more than his marginal
product, but protected from discharge by age discrimination law. In these
situations, there is a moral hazard but it does not seem sufficient to tempt
widespread misbehavior by employers. Nevertheless, in cataloguing the
advantages and disadvantages of confidentiality agreements or of
agreements to avoid the criminal law, if deterrence (with attendant savings
24

The doctrine is at its best when it discourages a second round of violence
between the original criminal and victim. If the law allows the victim to overcollect, the victim may be tempted to pursue the criminal or look for the criminal’s
property. In turn, the criminal will prepare for this attack. The conventional
limitation on “hot pursuit” addresses this problem though it is aimed at the
question of physical harm inflicted after a property crime. The doctrine is probably
misguided if applied to peaceful bargains between the parties.
25
In principle, private and public remedies can be combined. The employerembezzler, for example, might gain the state’s consent to their negotiated
payments so long as the wrongdoer serves a short time in prison. We do not pursue
such combinations in part because of the intuition that one major benefit of
settlement is the cost savings derived from avoiding trial and involving the
criminal law system.
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of trial and incarceration costs) is on the positive side of the ledger, it is
appropriate to note that false claims ought to be placed on the negative
side.26
Returning to civil cases, moral hazard is again a concern – but not a
showstopper – wherever the victim can collect more than compensatory
damages. When the tort victim, A, bargains with M, A does not know in
advance that M will pay handsomely for silence; M may opt for trial or
already face other plaintiffs with similar claims. Second, M has reason to
investigate the circumstances of A’s injury and to turn suspicions about
self-injury into a claim that A was comparatively negligent. Third, where
personal injury is involved – and this seems to be the focus of sunshine-inligation statutes – law often contemplates punitive damages and thus seems
to discount the moral hazard problem in favor of deterrence or strongly
expressive remedies; confidential settlements thus have good, or at least
familiar, company. Fourth, a deterrence perspective offers a reason to be
untroubled by moral hazard. Even if A manufactures a claim against M,
when M pays for confidentiality it is often because M thinks that A’s claim
will resonate with juries and encourage other claims. Allowing a payment
that produces profit for A is, in the end, likely to deter M in the first place,
and that is a major accomplishment. Finally, M can always go to trial, so
that there is an upper limit on A’s power to extract.
Nevertheless, if victims or even witnesses are to be rewarded for
coming forward to report wrongdoing, it is probably better for the payment
to come openly from the legal authority than for it to come secretly from the
accused, who hopes that a confidential agreement will keep the police and
criminal law system at bay. Private payments offer deterrence, as we have
stressed, but without the safeguards of criminal procedure and the ability to
counterclaim for defamation and other causes of action, they risk generating
false claims. This preference for public over private resolution is clearest
where the costs of public law are low. Thus, if tort suits could be greatly
streamlined, law would (and should) be less likely to favor settlements of
the kind we depicted between A and M. The more efficient a legal system,
the less is the social gain from avoiding it by way of confidential settlement
agreements.
If the legal system can be counted on to be reliable and relatively free of
interest-group corruption, then confidential settlements might be accepted
26

The false claims problem does not alone explain much. A storekeeper may
have incontrovertible evidence of AR’s crime, but law will still reject private
settlement for reasons discussed earlier.
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only where they preempt legal actions that are likely to end in money
payments between the settling parties. A settlement between A and M, the
injured victim and presumed tortfeasor, is in the shadow of a trial with the
same adversaries. A may be hoping for payments that substitute for those
that would be made to other injured parties, but it is not obvious that law
should object so long as the defendant is properly deterred. In contrast, the
storekeeper who seeks payment from a robber or embezzler is at least in
part capitalizing on the fact that incarceration is very costly to the
wrongdoer and of no direct benefit to the victim, whose testimony is
essential for conviction. If the law wanted to offer financial motivation to
victims and other witnesses, it could simply offer payments, as it
occasionally does with whistleblowers. When it does not, it is because it
fears that private enrichment will decrease credibility or even bring about
false claims, and that these costs exceed any additional deterrence that could
be availed. Note that the law’s disinclination to sort robbers according to
their ability to pay in order to avoid incarceration is not much of an
explanation; paying for testimony is surely less expensive than paying for
incarceration. In sum, it is easy to understand an aversion to confidential
agreements between armed robbers and their victims against a background
in which the state generally declines to award financial inducements to
victims.
False claims and moral hazards can also be assessed by way of the timehonored distinction between negligence and intentional wrongdoing. Law
seems most comfortable allowing a victim to collect multiple damages
when the defendant is an intentional wrongdoer and the evidence of its
wrongdoing is out of plaintiff’s control. If so, then there is a kind of
precedent for high-priced confidentiality agreements. If M* is an intentional
wrongdoer who places a high value on staying out of court, the injured
party, A, can extract a high settlement.27 The concern is not that A will
profit but rather that A will extract too little. A high settlement, like punitive
damages, deters wrongdoers like M* in contexts where moral hazard is
unlikely because the wrongdoer who acts intentionally rarely injures a
victim who contributes to the problem. Put differently, there is an intuition
that intentional wrongdoing is worse than negligence, so that the legal
system should be called in and not bypassed by confidential agreements.
But an alternative view is that intentional wrongdoing is less likely to
generate or interact with moral hazard problems, so that high, confidential
27

A law-and-economics approach favors punitive, or multiple, damages when
defendants think they can often escape detection or lawsuit. Law does not seem to
reflect this insight, so the case for high and confidential settlements is not as close
as it could be to punitive damages.
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settlements – in the manner of punitive damages – are relatively tolerable, if
not attractive.
The distinction, if any, between negligent and intentional wrongdoing
can be tested by returning once again to our storekeeper, S, and considering
his transactions with customers whose checks are rejected for insufficient
funds. Retail stores often give notice that they will charge $25 or even $50
for a returned check. Some states have laws barring charges above a
specified amount.28 The normal fee is greater than the average fee actually
charged to the depositor by its bank, but it is probably not more than that
fee plus the value of the time spent by the store employee tasked with
contacting the customer and obtaining payment. If S has reason to think that
the bad-check-writing was intentional, and thus criminal fraud, then S is
also likely to find that the customer will not quickly make good on the
check and fee. In that case, S has reason to contact the police. Cases in
which companies profit handsomely by collecting fees from bad-check
writers seem to involve collection companies rather than storekeepers, so
there is no indication of a false claim or moral hazard problem.
IV. SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES AND UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY PROCESSES
Sexual assault cases outside of university disciplinary systems can find
their way into civil and criminal courts. In these forums, as in university
disciplinary settings, many victims are eager to preserve their privacy and
are therefore at a bargaining disadvantage. The level of deterrence that
might be expected in most tort cases is unlikely to be met here because
defendants who would otherwise pay for confidentiality know that their
adversaries also value privacy. The balance of power is indeterminate,
though frequent withdrawals of claims, or even private settlements, are to
be expected. Sexual assault victims are encouraged to come forward in the
criminal system by a (limited) promise that they can remain (publicly)
unidentified, though in a tightly-knit community this is often impossible.
States might enable privacy either by statute or by way of judges’ deciding
to keep some part of a record sealed.29 Ideally, the promise of privacy, often
28

In Missouri, for example, an institution may add a service charge of no more
than twenty-five dollars. Rev. Stat. Mo. § 570.120.1, (2016). Legal action for bad
checks is also allowed in some states such as California, though certain conditions
must be met and the maximum recovery is $1,500. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1719
(1998).
29
For example, the Crime Victims Protection Act amended Florida law to
make all court records that could reveal the victim’s identity exempt from public
disclosure. Fla. Stat. 119.07(3)(f) (1994). States cannot always suppress disclosure
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supported by journalistic conventions, encourages meritorious claims. It is
apparent that both sides might be willing to pay for privacy, but law is
inclined to enable only one side’s anonymity.
Sexual assault cases processed on university campuses are like fraud
and employment discrimination matters in civil courts not only because of
the recently imposed preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,30 but also
because the pattern problem is paramount, and because there is an
information asymmetry between the parties who might bargain to preempt
decisions by the authorities. The asymmetry is not relevant in all cases,
because a serious claim need not be a part of a pattern, but in many cases
the accused knows better than the accuser whether there is a pattern of
wrongful behavior that can come to light if multiple accusers come forward.
A given victim cannot easily discern the value of confidentiality to the
accused. In contrast, the tort plaintiff, A, may not know how many others
have linked M to their injuries, but A has some idea of M’s sales volume
and an expert can help A assess M’s exposure in preparation for reaching a
confidentiality agreement. Even an employer often has a good sense of the
incarceration risk his employee-embezzler faces,31 though perhaps not of
the latter’s subjective valuation of liberty. None of this is true for the victim
of sexual assault – and any advertising or public search for other victims
will expose the offender in a way that makes it harder for the victim to
extract payment for confidentiality. The victim can offer confidentiality
only by foregoing a search for a pattern of misbehavior. We do not mean to
imply that the victim is eager or even willing to extract payment from the
perpetrator; indeed, campus cases involve victims who seem to place high
value on emotional and institutional support – as well as the removal of an
offender from campus. The storekeeper and tort victim encountered in
earlier Parts of this Article are likely to put much lower value on
of victims’ identities. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (First
Amendment protects newspaper against claim for damages under state law where
the newspaper truthfully but accidentally revealed victim’s identity).
30
See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. REV.
881, 901 (2016) (universities must investigate and adjudicate sexual assault claims
in order to fulfill Title IX obligations, and the process must use a preponderance of
the evidence standard).
31
Having rejected confidential agreements in typical criminal cases, like ARS, we do not consider repeat offender (“three strikes”) statutes, which can
obviously influence these bargains. A strong argument against confidentiality there
is that the police have much better information than does the storekeeper about the
criminal’s past and future career plans. The employer in the text’s example is
unlikely to continue employing a repeat offender.
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institutional support and removal; their defendants are likely to have an
easier time bargaining for confidentiality. Nevertheless, it is instructive (and
of practical interest) to consider confidentiality agreements between victims
and those they accuse of sexual assault – as well as other matters
adjudicated on campuses.
Imagine that Y engages in sexual activity with X when X is unable to
provide true consent. Subsequently, X initiates a complaint against Y within
a university’s disciplinary system. After the Title IX investigator questions
the parties, Y (in an unusual move, to be sure) offers X a monetary
settlement that includes a confidentiality agreement,32 and X then
withdraws her complaint. The argument for respecting the confidentiality
agreement and withdrawal is that future victims may be less inclined to file
complaints if they discover that, once initiated, they cannot be halted. But
given that the penalty Y faces within the disciplinary system does not inure
to X’s direct benefit, and is likely intended to provide a measure of campus
safety (in addition to deterrence and retribution), it seems imprudent for the
university to enable Y to pay X in order to end the matter. Even if Y is the
sort who can be deterred from sexual misbehavior by financial
consequences, deterrence requires that X extract a substantial settlement
from Y. This seems unlikely because Y knows that X is not eager to recount
her experience to strangers and subject herself to questioning. Put
differently, even if we do not analogize the case to that involving the
storekeeper and armed robber, because we think that the victim of sexual
assault identifies more with other similarly situated victims than does the
typical victim of a robbery, there is reason to fear that X will not extract
enough, in return for a promise of confidentiality, to deter Y. X might well
reason that Y faces suspension from the university and will pay a good deal
for X to withdraw her claim, but at the same time Y knows that X wants to
avoid the emotional costs attached to a hearing. X may also not know
whether her complaint against Y enables other victims to succeed with
similar accusations.33 In short, because the accuser in these cases is likely to
value privacy far more than plaintiffs in most civil and criminal suits,
accusers may settle too quickly and cheaply to serve the deterrence goal.
A very different argument against confidential settlement is that there is
a danger of false claims. As in the claim against the alleged embezzler, and
unlike that against the armed robber, there is rarely incontrovertible
32

If the university has imposed a no-contact order, as is common, the parties
can bargain through their attorneys.
33
See our earlier discussion of sexual assault cases against celebrity
defendants in Section I-B.
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evidence against the wrongdoer. The prospect of profit as well as protection
of (the complainant’s) privacy raises the danger of a false claim.
Note also that the conventional reason for allowing and enabling
confidential settlements – that they save on trial and error costs – is very
weak here. These hearings are short affairs, so that they are not associated
with high costs, at least of the conventional kind. To be sure, the parties
may anticipate significant emotional costs, but that is true for accused
criminals and prosecution witnesses in many criminal cases and it is rarely
taken to be a separate argument in favor of plea bargains.
An important countervailing argument, as expressed at the outset of this
discussion, is that victims may hesitate to bring claims (even more than they
do at present) if they learn that they cannot withdraw from the adjudicatory
process. The question for Title IX officers and university counsel is whether
this single argument outweighs the others, or whether Title IX should be
read to grant the complainant the right to withdraw a claim.34 We suspect it
does not and, indeed, that if a university were certain that the accused, Y,
had paid cash to the accuser, X, it would proceed with a disciplinary hearing
and try to manage with the evidence at hand. It might even choose to
discipline any student who failed to appear at a hearing.
It can be useful to compare the claim to other matters that come before
similar disciplinary boards. Familiar cases pit a student against a university
because of alleged misbehavior such as vandalism or plagiarism. The
university is a party as well as a provider of law. Financial settlements are
inappropriate not because of under-deterrence but either because of the
danger that wealthy students will buy their way out of disciplinary charges
or because the university’s impartiality will be questioned if it stands to
gain money in a system with no appeals. In cases involving academic
dishonesty, a student or faculty member might accuse a student of violating

34

Title IX is silent with respect to a right to withdraw a complaint, though
universities sometimes provide for withdrawal. See, e.g., Eastern Va. Medical
School, Title IX/Sex Discrimination Reporting Process § III.G., available at
http://www.evms.edu/about_evms/leadership/general_counsel/legal_and_complian
ce/legalcompliance_policies__information/title_ix/complaint_process/
(“The
Reporting Party may withdraw a Report or Grievance at any time. EVMS may,
however, still have a duty to investigate matters (to the extent possible without the
Reporting Party’s cooperation) and take appropriate action.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921059

21-Feb-17]

SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

23

a university rule; neither state nor federal courts are inclined or well-suited
to these claims.35
Imagine that a faculty member accuses a student of plagiarism, and the
university begins to investigate and schedules a disciplinary hearing. Now
the faculty member withdraws the allegation and says that she and the
student have settled the matter. Would the university dismiss the case? If
the faculty member insists that after some recent discussion with the student
she realized that her assignments had been unclear regarding the use of
various sources, and the student simply misunderstood the rules, then there
would be little point in pursuing the charge previously brought against the
student. But what if the faculty member said nothing of the sort and there is
suspicion that the student paid the faculty member, perhaps because a
wealthy parent had traveled to campus and met with the instructor?
Alternatively, what if the student, once charged, files a claim of harassment
against the faculty member, and then the two bargain and agree to the
mutual withdrawal of all claims. The startling possibility of payment offers
some deterrence, and it seems objectionable to allow the parties to convert
or avoid a remedy determined by the authority into cash. It would be
objectionable if the instructor announced that she and the student had
agreed that the charge would be withdrawn on condition that the student’s
family donates a specified amount to a given charitable cause, and it is
certainly objectionable if the payment profits the instructor. Indeed, the
university’s suspension and expulsion remedies ought to be less convertible
to cash than the penalties faced by a robber or embezzler, because it is
implausible that the most efficient and politically acceptable penalties are
fines. In contrast to the university, which prefers suspension and similar
remedies, it is likely that with respect to many crimes the state regards its
principle remedy, incarceration, as a second-best remedy. Note that the
faculty member, like the storekeeper, gains nothing when the student is
disciplined in the conventional, nonmonetary fashion. If faculty and
students can bring claims of academic dishonesty against one another and
35

When a disappointed party challenges the university’s procedures and
determinations, courts are generally deferential to the university’s rules and norms.
See, e.g., Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994)
(concluding that a disciplinary action or procedure is fundamentally unfair,
arbitrary, or capricious if it deviates from established university rules); Holert v.
Univ. of Chicago, 751 F. Supp. 1294, (1990) (disciplined student entitled only to
procedural safeguards that the university agreed to provide); Boehm v. Univ. of
Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine, 573 A.2d 575 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(holding that there was no basis for interfering with the right of a private school to
impose its own punishments for cheating).
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then settle privately, there is a distinct problem of false claims because the
claimant suffers no injury and yet stands to profit from the accused’s fear of
conviction, trial costs, or loss of reputation. It seems unwise to respect a
confidential agreement in this context; it converts a university’s chosen
remedy, such as suspension or expulsion, into a private monetary
payment.36
To be sure, in this case, as in the sexual assault context, we are unlikely
to know whether the accused actually bought his way out of a nonmonetary
remedy. But the prospect of confidentiality, or private settlement itself,
surely encourages payments in both settings. If settlement is acceptable for
sexual assault claims but not for plagiarism, it is again because of the great
preference given to rules that encourage victims to report and bring claims
of sexual assault in the first place. A further distinction is that few sexual
assault cases can proceed intelligibly without the participation of the
complainant and respondent, while many cases of academic dishonesty
could go forward on the basis of the written evidence available to the
adjudicator.
An interesting feature of these university cases is that while the parties
may bargain for confidentiality, and even agree not to discuss the case and
not to denigrate one another, the university has acquired enough
information to watch for patterns of misbehavior. In the tort case between A
and M, unless the parties go to trial it is difficult to know whether there is
any merit to A’s claim. The same is true for a sexual assault case against a
celebrity, as discussed in Section I-B. But here the university’s own
investigator has interviewed the parties and has often questioned witnesses
and friends of the protagonists. The university cannot know whether a
disciplinary committee would have found the respondent responsible under
the prevailing preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, but it has much
more information than does the legal authority in most tort, assault, or
embezzlement cases. We might regard the private agreement as semiconfidential because the university knows everything but the terms of the
settlement. Similarly, even if the university chooses to cease prosecution of
the academic dishonesty case sketched above, the university has
36

The situation is not quite like the storekeeper-robber negotiation. In that case
even with incontrovertible evidence, we do not want to allow private parties to
convert the state’s chosen remedy into cash. But here, the university might be
willing to offer a choice between payment and suspension for some violations, but
it is inhibited by its inability to separate credibly its judicial and other functions. If
there were incontrovertible evidence of wrongdoing, private payments might be
acceptable.
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information about the behavior of the student who was accused. It would be
unfair to say that the accused is essentially convicted without a hearing –
because no university discipline is meted out – but if another claim is
brought against the same accused, the university is sure to take into account
the earlier case, however dismissed. This semi-confidentiality, expanded
upon in the next Part, should not distract us from the concern about
insufficient deterrence. That concern is heightened in the campus sexual
assault case by the observation that victims bear costs in adjudication and
might therefore not extract as much from – or deter – their wrongdoers as
do settling victims of other wrongs.
In these campus cases the accused might well be willing to pay more for
the promise of full confidentiality, but that requires bargaining with the
accuser before any complaint is reported to the Title IX investigator.
Moreover, as a practical matter, victims are unlikely to want to
communicate with those they accuse; one consequence of beginning the
disciplinary process is the (oft desired) benefit of a no-contact order
between the parties. In turn, the accused is often caught by surprise. Many
sexual interactions take place close to the consent/no-consent line, and it is
unlikely that many people are sufficiently confident that they will be
accused as to cause them to initiate bargains for payment in return for
confidentiality. Where the sexual interaction ends badly and a party does
have reason to think that an accusation is forthcoming, the best defense is
likely to be a quick departure, silence, or apology. An offer of settlement is
insensitive and unwise – unless it is simply an offer to stay far away from
the other party, a homemade no-contact agreement.
Settlement is more likely in cases where each party has brought a claim
against the other. X accuses Y of nonconsensual sex, but Y accuses X of the
same, claiming both parties were inebriated, or Y accuses X of harassing
him by filing a false claim in the wake of a collapsed relationship. Each
party may firmly believe the truth of his or her allegations, and each avoids
the emotional costs and risk of unfavorable judgment by settling the case
and withdrawing the complaint. Their settlement may have a monetary
component, especially where lawyers’ fees are involved, but the important
motivation is (apt to be the desire) to steer clear of university discipline, and
perhaps also to avoid the emotional toll of a hearing. If the university allows
the withdrawal, it is because it is impractical to proceed without the parties,
because to disallow withdrawal risks chilling future claims, and because the
university has already obtained enough information about the interaction to
assess a pattern of wrongdoing or a threat to “campus safety,” now or in the
event of another accusation against one of the parties.
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V. BETWEEN CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY
A. Translucency in Civil Cases
In the torts context, there are some cases where it is the victim who
prefers privacy – apart from the possibility of using privacy as a means of
extracting a greater settlement – and others where it is the defendant who
prefers anonymity or other forms of confidentiality. There are several
reasons why the defendant may value confidentiality, especially with regard
to substantial settlements. It might raise litigation costs for (other) plaintiffs;
it hides the signal about the substantive claim from other parties who have
not connected their injuries to defendant’s behavior; it keeps defendant’s
assessment of its exposure in court hidden from other plaintiffs who might
negotiate or litigate differently if they were well informed; and it protects
the firm’s reputation.
There are certainly cases where defendants are happy to advertise large
settlements. Thus, a defendant enmeshed in litigation over an oil-spill is
dealing with a substantive matter that is already known to the public. A
large payment might enhance rather than detract from its corporate image,
and it might satisfy regulators and legislators who would otherwise prepare
to impose further burdens on the identified polluter. In contrast, a law firm
that settles a discrimination claim initiated by a female partner might prefer
confidentiality for all the reasons noted above. Publicity might hurt the firm
when it recruits new employees; it might dissuade some clients from
engaging the firm; it might suggest to other women at the firm that the firm
has indeed discriminated against women, and they ought to file or threaten
to bring claims; and it might cause women who think they were the victims
of discrimination by the firm to make or increase demands because they
now perceive the firm’s vulnerability or inclination to settle. The discussion
in Part I emphasized that the firm’s gains from confidentiality might
translate into a higher payment to the first complainant in this case; in turn,
if she agrees to confidentiality the firm is further deterred by the larger
payment. Ideally, if she can extract something close to the full value of
confidentiality, there will be a social gain because of the savings in trial and
negotiation costs with other plaintiffs. The first successful complainant is
rewarded for discovering the “treasure,” and for giving the firm reason to
change its ways.
The preceding description may be too optimistic, but it is unlikely to be
entirely misguided. It suggests the possibility of a middle ground; the
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defendant firm might pay for some confidentiality (and thus be deterred to a
degree), but it might be prevented from keeping everything hidden from
other possible victims. We have applied the term semi-confidential to
agreements regarding which the precise settlement terms of sexual assault
cases are secreted by the parties, but where the convening authority is aware
of the original claims and testimony of the parties. Indeed, the authority in
those campus cases has about all the information it needs to discern a
troubling pattern of behavior. In most civil cases, however, the legal
authority has not undertaken any investigation, and so it has no information.
A compromise, or semi-confidential, approach must aim to liberate some
information that is useful to third parties or the state, while still encouraging
the defendant to settle – at a price that packs some deterrence punch.
The most obvious compromise is to allow the amount of settlement to
be confidential, but not the subject matter. There are certainly other
compromises between transparency and confidentiality; the parties’
locations or identities might be withheld, as they are in some countries.37
But the intuition behind the suggestion that law support semiconfidentiality, or translucency, with respect to the amount of settlement, is
that doing so might minimize error costs while retaining the deterrence
value of disclosure. The defendant firm pays to keep evidence of its
vulnerability secret; its reputation and other interests might also be
preserved if third parties are in the dark about the settlement amount. After
all, many firms make modest payments to avoid litigation, and news of a
very large settlement is usually required to attract attention and trigger
presumptions of bad behavior.38 Disclosure’s effects, however, operate
along several dimensions and the suggestion that secrecy as to the monetary
component of confidentiality agreements may correctly balance deterrence
and error is not easy to justify. But it is certainly possible that allowing
complete confidentiality, both for settled cases and for payments in return
In France, for example, litigant identity is protected in divorce proceedings;
criminal prosecution involving sexually transmitted diseases or nursing of
children; some defamation claims; and cases involving minors, victims of sexual
assault, or persons who have been the subject of plenary adoption. See Salomé
Cordier & Marie Castagné, L’Anonymisation des Decisions de Justice, LE PETIT
JURIST,
Section
II.A.1,
available
at
http://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/L%E2%80%99anonymisation%20des%20d%C3%A9cisi
ons%20de%20justice.pdf.
38
If disclosure of settlement amounts raises costs (errors) more than benefits
(deterrence or correctly aimed compensation), then greater secrecy is desirable.
This conclusion assumes a kind of monotonicity or single-peakedness such that it
is not yet better to have total transparency.
37

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921059

28

SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

[21-Feb-17

for releases before claims are filed, has negative effects on uninformed third
parties and under-deters wrongdoers, because victims do not recognize how
much they can extract. This Article’s suggestion is that in these cases law
should encourage translucency; defendants (even in the pre-filing stage)
should be encouraged to disclose information but not asked to disclose the
amount of payment to a settling party. This translucency proposal
presupposes that a plaintiff cannot adequately assess the total liability the
defendant faces in the event that other plaintiffs are fully informed; the
plaintiff, therefore, will not extract the full value of secrecy to the
defendant, and may not extract enough to properly deter this and other
defendants. Translucency rewards plaintiffs in proportion to their injuries
and encourages all of them to come forward with their individual claims.
On the other hand, by keeping the amount of settlement secret, plaintiffs
base their claims more on information related to their injuries and less on
information related to the settling behavior of the defendant. Note, too, that
inasmuch as strike suit plaintiffs are encouraged by blockbuster settlements,
translucency may reduce their incentives to file.39
Any disclosure requirement, whether partial or complete, runs the risk
of driving bargains earlier in time or further underground. But there are
ways to encourage translucency. One of these is to make it a requirement of
professional responsibility; the same rules that allow attorneys to withhold
some information from their present clients because of prior confidentiality
agreements to which the attorneys were privy, could require attorneys to
disclose information to the authorities or to third parties of whom they are
aware. A second strategy is to refuse to enforce agreements that violated the
disclosure requirement. The defendant who seeks confidentiality might be
expected to withhold payments until the end of the quiet period, and now
the plaintiff will fear that payment will not be made as promised. This is a
weak strategy because the parties can resort to third-party intermediaries. A
39

While various translucency proposals can require disclosure or allow secrecy
with respect to any number of settlement features, our distinguishing subject matter
from the amount of settlement focuses directly on gaining deterrence while
minimizing error. In most cases, other features of litigation and settlement –
including jurisdiction, presiding judge, parties’ attorneys, and length of
negotiations – impact deterrence and error weakly and unevenly. Essential claims
and bargaining outcomes are far more important. Similarly, our proposal for
translucency in sexual assault cases, discussed infra Parts IV and V, is based upon
the observation that privacy is of special importance to the parties in these cases,
and is likely to affect the incentive to bring a claim. There may be other specialized
settings where effective translucency proposals might revolve around particular
settlement features in order to optimize deterrence and error.
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third strategy is to attach a penalty to any failure to abide by sunshine laws
and, in this case, to partial sunshine requirements, for it stands to reason that
our suggestion is that sunshine laws be trimmed to require disclosure of the
substance but not the terms of settlements where there is reason to think that
serious third-party injury is at stake.40 The penalty for nondisclosure might
carry with it a free pass for any party that reveals the other’s violation.41 A
third strategy is simply to make it clear that courts will not enforce full
confidentiality agreements; if M values confidentiality, M is counting on the
settling plaintiff, A, not to disclose out of fear that A will then have
breached the contract with M and be required to forfeit the amount received
from M as specified in the confidentiality agreement. This remedy is not as
powerful as it first seems because A does not usually gain from disclosure.
A novel strategy to promote translucency (or transparency for that
matter) is to use the tax code. Payments by businesses can be allowed as
deductible only if the substance or topic of the settlement has been
disclosed in accord with the policy of translucency. Note that it will be hard
for parties to hide and take deductions for large payments unless the settling
claimant is a vendor or other party to whom the firm might make ordinary
and necessary payments in the course of business. In principle, payments
made under agreements that violate state sunshine laws might in any event
not be deductible under federal law because tax law allows deductions only
40

In the sexual assault context, translucency encourages victims to bring
claims by allowing them to keep their identities secret. In the tort context,
translucency discourages strategic suits while information about the substance of a
claim is shared for the benefit of third-party safety.
41
A similar set of strategies pertains to anti-bribery laws. See, e.g., OECD,
THE CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 44 (2011) (noting
that in the Philippines, an offer or solicitation of bribery constitutes attempted
bribery, and carries a significantly lower penalty than the full offense); see also id.
at 43 (noting that a number of Asia-Pacific countries carry lower penalties for
offering rather than receiving a bribe); OECD, THE OECD CONVENTION ON
BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 247-48 (2007) (same for a number of European
countries). In the United States, the Department of Justice provides incentives for
corporations to self-report any violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), trading a reduction in punishment for cooperation with investigators. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program, JUSTICE
BLOGS, Apr. 5, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/criminal-divisionlaunches-new-fcpa-pilot-program, accessed Jan. 7, 2017. Reducing the penalty for
self-reporting companies is crucial to the enforcement of anti-bribery laws. In an
OECD study of 427 bribery cases, 31% were detected through self-reporting
compared to only 13% discovered by law enforcement. OECD, OECD FOREIGN
BRIBERY REPORT 15 (2014).
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for ordinary and necessary expenses and not for fines or illegal payments, as
determined by state (or local or federal) law. Thus, a delivery firm may
reimburse its drivers for speeding tickets or even for fines payable because
they drove recklessly or under the influence of alcohol, but these payments
are nondeductible to both the drivers and the firm.42 Similarly, at least the
premium paid by M to A in return for confidentiality ought not to be
deductible by M, if the confidentiality violates sunshine laws or the
translucency standard suggested here.
Most extant sunshine laws, it should be noted, do not stop at
translucency; they aim for transparency where a defendant has engaged in a
pattern of wrongdoing that individual victims have trouble discerning on
their own. They are also useful or best understood as corrective deterrents
aimed at cases where a defendant, like M, believes that no one but the
settling plaintiff, A, will see the connection A has made between the injury
and the defendant’s behavior. M must also count on professional
responsibility rules to prevent rather than require A’s attorney from sharing
information with other clients.43 At the same time, we have suggested that
M often has reason to fear false claims by plaintiffs who might imitate A.
Mandatory transparency, as required by some sunshine laws, likely goes too
far because news of A’s claim will bring forth claimants who erroneously,
irrationally, or strategically believe M injured them. M may already be
optimally deterred, or justly and retributively sanctioned, but now
transparency generates further, unsupported claims. To the extent that they
mandate full disclosure, sunshine laws implicitly suppose that the social
benefits of additional lawsuits, which may or may not include more
payments to victims, exceed the costs of additional litigation and greater
42

See 26 U.S.C. § 162(f) (1986) (“No deduction shall be allowed [as a
business expense] for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the
violation of any law.”); § 165(c) (1986) (fines and penalties not deductible as
“losses of individuals”).
43
But thus far the rules encourage settlement, and do not require an attorney to
do his or her best with respect to a subsequent client’s case. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2016) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to,
information relating to the representation of a client,” which includes information
learned during settlement negotiations); see also R. 1.8(b), R 1.9 (establishing a
duty not to reveal information relating to the representation of current and former
clients). See, e.g., D.C. Eth. Op. 335 (2006) (advising that settlement provisions
prohibit a party’s lawyer from disclosing the amount and terms of the settlement).
Such restrictions do not put the attorney in conflict with the duties owed to future
clients. Note that, under these rules, a second client will be no better off going to
another unconflicted attorney.
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error in the legal system. Translucency offers a compromise between
confidentiality and sunshine laws, and the translucency proposal advanced
here extends to agreements beyond the reach of sunshine laws to payments
made before any claims are filed. In fact, Texas’s sunshine law instructs
courts not to seal documents, including pre-filing settlement terms, that
have “any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety,” but specifically excludes “all reference to any
monetary consideration.”44 The Texas statute has received attention because
of the litigation it has spawned, though the translucency feature seems
unnoticed by courts and commentators.45
Note that the enforcement tool offered by tax law allows many
interpersonal claims to go untouched, and this is fitting because they are
rarely indicative of patterns of wrongdoing. Thus, when individuals D and E
have a road accident, and D is apparently at fault, small and even modest
claims are often settled without any notice given to the police or to either
driver’s insurer.46 D seeks to avoid higher insurance premiums, inasmuch as
drivers are experience rated, and may also seek to avoid attention if there
44

Texas R.Civ.Pro. 76a (2016).
Robert C. Nissen, Open Court Records in Product Liability Litigation Under
Texas Rule 76a, 72 TEX. L. REV. 931 (1994). Texas’s courts have held that
settlement amounts are not the proper subject of discovery. See Ford Motor Co. v.
The Hon. Bonnie Leggat, 984 S.W.2d 643 (1995). But see In re Cont’l Ins. Co.,
994 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tex. App. 1999) (permitting discovery when settlement
amounts may negate or offset insurance carrier’s liability). Courts and
commentators seem to think that it is unfair or unproductive to force the disclosure
of settlement amounts, because a subsequent settling plaintiff will take the prior
settlement amount as a starting point, thus freeriding on it after a fashion. Perhaps
no plaintiff will want to settle early. See Andrew D. Miller, Comment, Federal
Antisecrecy Legislation: A Model Act to Safeguard the Public from CourtSanctioned Hidden Hazards, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 371, 373 (1993)
(suggesting that the secrecy of settlement agreement terms prevents future
plaintiffs from gaining an unfair advantage).
46
Most auto insurance contracts require immediate notification of all
accidents, but the remedy for breach is that the insurer can choose to terminate the
contract. In most cases, it does not know of the breach and, in any event, if it wants
to terminate the contract it can usually find some reason to do so. Similarly, when
the contract is renewed, or the insured moves to another insurer, the new contract
is entered into with the insurer unaware of the unreported accident. Substantial
accidents involving personal injury, fatality, or property damage of more than
$1500 (in Illinois, for example) must by statute be reported to the police. 625 Il.
Compiled Stat. 5/11-406(a). The threatened remedy for nondisclosure is that the
state can suspend the nondiscloser’s driver’s license, but this is rare.
45
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are outstanding arrest warrants for D, if D is an undocumented immigrant, if
D is driving without a valid license, or if D is on a trip that D’s employer or
spouse would find objectionable. In these cases, common intuitions track
the argument in this Article. Few people regard E as immoral if E senses
D’s reluctance, and bargains for a homespun remedy that gives E somewhat
more money than it will cost to repair E’s automobile. The
overcompensation deters D in a manner that creates no moral hazard risk
because E cannot identify vulnerable drivers in advance. Moreover, the
legal system shares in the savings associated with avoiding trial. D’s
payments would not be deductible in any form, so it is inconsequential but
also untroubling to note that under the proposal advanced here, D cannot
deduct the payment to E.
There is, however, no logical connection between deductibility and
translucency, and the former is simply one way of encouraging the latter.
Law could try to penalize complete confidentiality in a variety of ways, and
it can encourage translucency or transparency with direct rewards, as it does
for whistleblowers, or with indirect rewards, as it does when it offers
reductions in penalties or favorable plea bargains in return for cooperation
in criminal cases.
B. Translucency for Misdemeanors
A useful comparison is to shoplifting. Shopkeepers do not always report
those they have caught, but we have never heard of a shoplifter and
storekeeper agreeing to a payment beyond restitution to settle the matter
confidentially.47 It may be that the shopkeeper who does call in the police
demonstrates a sort of irrationality; the profit-maximizing strategy is
probably to free-ride on other merchants and not to waste time reporting
and testifying. Shopkeepers may fear that if they seek to extract payment
they will be accused as extortionists or robbers who have exceeded their
claims of right. This is unfortunate; it is plausible that something
resembling a fine, payable to the victim-reporter, is the best available
deterrent. We would certainly advise someone who was caught shoplifting
and who risked arrest to offer super-compensation, perhaps in the form of
47

Homespun remedies are not unknown for other misdemeanors. A young
vandal might agree to work in the victim’s store as a way of making amends, much
as deadbeats of yesteryear stayed to wash dishes in the restaurant’s kitchen.
Monetary payments, however, are rare. We can find no sign of a shopkeeper
announcing ex ante that shoplifters who are apprehended by the store’s security
guards will be required to pay a multiple of the value of anything taken – or the
police will be called.
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purchases in the store, in return for a promise not to call the police. Law’s
plausible goals seem better served by this remedy than by episodic
processing in the formal legal system. If confidentiality in this case is
troubling then, again, a kind of translucency seems superior; the shopkeeper
reports the wrongdoer in the interest of pattern recognition, and might even
be rewarded for doing so by law’s allowing a fraction of the penalty
payment to go unreported on the storekeeper’s tax return. If the shopkeeper
demands a truly extortionary payment, the shoplifter can always take her
chances and refuse to make payment, knowing that the police might be
called.
We have already discussed the possibility and danger of confidentiality
agreements with respect to more serious criminal wrongdoing, where in the
absence of a bargain the victim is quite likely to call the police. If there are
settings where confidentiality agreements are imaginable, as was arguably
the case regarding the embezzler discussed in Part III, law might decide that
translucency is the superior rule. It allows the employer to deter the
embezzler with a financial incentive, but would also allow the state to
gather useful information and protect others from a serial wrongdoer. Law
could encourage partial reporting by guaranteeing a kind of transactional
immunity, providing that information about confidential settlements will not
be used to pursue wrongdoers, or at least not one who was party to the
agreement.
C. The Translucency Ideal
Assume, then, a rule of translucency requiring A and M to disclose only
the precise subject matter of their agreement, which will often be a
restatement of the legal claim filed by A. As discussed, M might be
motivated by a variety of inducements, including the prospect of deducting
payments made to A.48 Think, for example, of claims that the prescription
medication Viagra causes blindness by restricting blood supply to the optic
nerve. If A and M (in this case, Pfizer) settle a claim, the disclosure might
be: “The claim filed by A against M for damages, in the form of loss of
48

The notion of encouraging settlements but requiring some information for
third parties could be advanced by allowing the parties to secret only the amounts
of large settlements, whether pre- or post-filing, such as those exceeding $10,000.
This exemption serves to lower administrative costs. Under current law, while the
application of sunshine laws varies by state, even broadly construed sunshine laws
often require a weighing of the parties’ interests and the public interest, thus
limiting their application to larger claims that can be said to affect the public as a
whole. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann § 4.24.611(4)(b).
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sight, that A believes he suffered as a result of taking Viagra, has been
settled. The parties have agreed not to discuss the terms of settlement.”
Potential claimants can see the connection A has made between his injury
and M’s behavior, and they are free to follow or conduct further research on
the matter. Pfizer is free to point out that the few men who developed
blindness had diabetes or other preexisting conditions, so that it is hardly
clear that Viagra has this dangerous side-effect. Moreover, consumers who
contemplate using Viagra, whether by prescription or in the active
aftermarket, might rethink the matter and avoid the drug. Translucency as
expressed through a neutral and searchable website provides more
information than these users could have obtained from newspaper stories or
the initial filing of lawsuits alone. They now know that Viagra’s
manufacturer paid at least a modest settlement to one plaintiff. Other
plaintiffs may also have received settlements and simply decided to keep
their medical condition, performance anxiety, or newly acquired wealth
private. A confidentiality agreement would have required filing in order to
be enforceable. Note, in passing, that neither transparency nor translucency
need go so far as to sacrifice a plaintiff’s reasonable preference for privacy.
Most of A’s identifying characteristics are of little interest to other parties.
In all these cases, the fact of settlement and the nature of the underlying
claim provide different information than does the amount of settlement. If B
learns that A extracted a settlement from M far in excess of what might be
expected from the injuries A is known to have suffered, then B is on notice
that M is paying to keep people like B from coming forward. M seeks to
avoid numerous trials and reputational loss. On the other hand, if B knows
only that M has paid some nontrivial amount to A, B has useful information
about the likelihood that his own injuries are connected to M’s behavior in a
way that might make litigation or negotiation worthwhile. M might only
have compensated A, or paid a fraction of A’s actual losses. The point is
that knowledge of the substance of A’s settlement with M may well help B
discover the cause of his own injury and facilitate a payment from M. But
knowledge of the amount of the A-M settlement probably adds less socially
useful information than it does encourage strategic suits and wasteful
litigation. The less that is revealed to B and to others, the greater the
expected (confidential or translucent) payment to A. This payment serves as
a deterrent. Plaintiffs like B have private information about their own
claims, including medical costs, property losses, and emotional losses, and
these do not depend on the wrongdoers’ settlements with prior plaintiffs. If
A underestimates the connection between M and other victims, or otherwise
fails to drive a hard bargain, M can purchase silence from A for less than its
full deterrent value. Translucency drives up the costs of settlement, whether
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A underestimates its value or not, and can deter M ex ante or provide
compensation to individual victims ex post.49
Still, there are cases where complete confidentiality or complete
transparency is preferable to translucency. The simplest of these cases is
where even modest disclosure is expected to unleash so many strategic or
misguided lawsuits that M is induced to take precautions, including product
recalls, that are in fact socially inefficient. M may now be induced to recall
a product in order to prevent further injuries and lawsuits that would arise
only because of the disclosure.50 M calculates that the cost of additional
care is worthwhile simply to reduce its litigation costs; M would have
preferred to pay for confidentiality in order to discourage baseless but costly
lawsuits, and confidentiality would have been socially efficient. At the other
extreme are cases where anything less than full disclosure protects M from
socially efficient suits, and encourages M not to take socially efficient
precautions to prevent further injuries. The inefficiency can also be of the
ex ante kind; the inability to enter into binding and complete confidentiality
agreements might cause M to take greater but inefficient precautions at the
outset. In contrary cases, the prospect of secreting some information causes
M to take insufficient precautions at the outset. The central idea is that
confidentiality, translucency, and transparency may each have their
moments, but law must ordinarily choose a rule, or at least assign one rule
to types of cases as the sunshine laws have sought to do. This Article has
suggested that the deterrence power of payments for confidentiality is
underappreciated, so that a move away from the transparency of sunshine
laws to something a little more respectful of private bargains is worthy
trying. Translucency is a compromise that aims to deter defendants with
higher settlements but provide enough disclosure to encourage socially
efficient precaution-taking as well as fewer wasteful, strategic claims.
Translucency (or even full transparency) is easiest to defend where it
helps reveal a pattern of misbehavior, as observed in the claim against the
49

A further distinction is that secrecy can encourage multiple plaintiffs to
search for valuable settlements in a way that is wastefully duplicative and also
risks encouraging M to take socially inefficient precautions. A may be able to
discern some of the value of secrecy to M, but not its full amount. To the extent
that translucency reveals the true value of secrecy, duplicative search costs for
inefficient confidential settlements are reduced.
50
If the assumption about M’s behavior is correct, then a recall or other
precaution is socially inefficient and undertaken simply to prevent baseless
lawsuits. If M’s behavior is imperfect, then disclosure of the substance of the
settlement might stimulate desirable precautions.
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serial sexual assaulter, and as likely to be the case in many discrimination
claims. Employees who have suffered discrimination, like victims of sexual
assault and harassment, may perceive that it is costly to bring claims. If,
however, they can easily learn not only of the existence of other claims but
also of their settlement for nontrivial sums, they may come forward in
search of similar compensation and help reveal a pattern of wrongdoing.51
The more the law requires disclosure, the fewer settlements there
will be, and in civil cases – unlike the criminal context – the longstanding
policy appears to be in favor of settlement rather than in favor of reporting
to law enforcement authorities. If law wanted to discourage confidential
agreements, it could make the payments by M nondeductible; payments that
arise out of tort suits or in settlement of these suits are generally deductible
because they substitute for (deductible) precaution costs rather than for
fines or other penalties where the aim is to discourage the underlying
behavior entirely. This tax treatment would discourage settlement because
on the margin M knows that transparency followed by other suits that will
settle or go to trial generate costs, but deductible costs.
VI. TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL: PATTERNS, PRIVACY, AND ADJUDICATION
ACCURACY
As we have seen, the beneficial effects of permissible secrecy depend on
context. This Article has identified specific cases where law should prefer
translucency, transparency, or secrecy; we now offer a general framework
that incorporates these examples and facilitates analysis of new cases.
Consider a policymaker who wishes to maximize the social value of
settlements. There are four categories of benefits and costs: (1) the
deterrence value of settlement – which must always be compared to the
51

Imagine a claim for back wages by an employee who claims that the
discriminatory practice of her employer prevented her promotion and higher
earnings. These higher earnings would have been deductible to the employer as an
ordinary and necessary business expense. In turn, payment in settlement of the
claim, or payment as the result of a judgment, would also be deductible. Now
assume that law requires translucency or more. One way to encourage compliance
is to refuse to enforce confidentiality agreements that are not disclosed as required.
Defendants would pay less because they would know that a settling employee who
breached the agreement would not be required by law to return the settlement
amount. The suggestion in the text is that another means of discouraging
confidentiality would be to disallow deductions for payments made following
undisclsosed agreements.
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deterrence value of trials and judgments, (2) the related value of plaintiffs’
incentives to bring claims, (3) the cost of false claims, and (4) the cost of
administering law. Note that the social value of deterrence is analytically
identical to the concept of efficient precautions in tort law. An efficiencyminded policymaker seeks to minimize the total cost of accidents.
Precautions are encouraged with liability rules, but only when they are costjustified. Similarly, the policymaker should require (or not require)
disclosure of settlements so as to minimize the cost of antisocial behavior,
including litigation, settlement, and administrative costs. Disclosure is
costly, so it should be required only when cost-justified. It creates benefits
(by deterring antisocial behavior) and costs (by chilling legitimate claims
and encouraging false ones). Thus, parametric assumptions must be made in
order to reach a conclusion about the value of a particular sunshine regime.
This decision is simplified somewhat by the observation, discussed in
Section I-B and Part IV, that disclosure creates greater deterrence benefits
when it reveals a pattern of antisocial behavior. In turn, pattern recognition
encourages legitimate claims because it reduces private discovery costs.
Victims can more easily identify wrongdoers and bring viable claims. Law
must be on guard against false claimants, but the more there is a pattern of
wrongdoing and liability is difficult to assess, the more costly is secrecy of
settlement between the wrongdoer and a victim.
When wrongdoing is episodic and not a predictor of future wrongdoing,
transparent or translucent sunshine laws are of little value; if a defendant
pays for confidentiality, it is because the defendant fears false claims or
some reputational loss. The other two categories of benefits and costs fall
out of the picture because, by hypothesis, the wrongdoing is a one-off
event.52 If the defendant pays handsomely for a confidential settlement, the
payment itself provides a substantial deterrent. Without a pattern, legitimate
follow-on claims cannot be chilled by secrecy because victims’ ability to
discern wrongdoing remains unchanged. On the other hand, public
settlement may encourage strike suits to the extent that opportunistic
plaintiffs are able to discern the settlement behavior of defendants. In legal
domains that do not exhibit patterns of wrongdoing, law should therefore
accommodate the parties’ bargain for secrecy. This is especially so where
the costs of administering law are high inasmuch as disclosure can
encourage more lawsuits.

52

Plaintiffs who value privacy in episodic claims still retain bargaining power
to adequately deter defendants who value their reputation and fear litigation.
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Fig. 1: The Effects of Patterns, Privacy, and Adjudication Accuracy (Adj. Acc.)
Across Disclosure Regimes. Inferior outcomes in bold.53

The discussion in Part IV explained why pattern revelation in sexual
assault cases is important for deterrence, but mandated disclosure in those
cases may chill claims or lead to insufficient settlements that do little to
deter wrongdoers. Our analysis suggests that a second parametric
assumption is required for evaluating sunshine laws, that is, parties’
valuation of privacy. When this value is high, and pattern recognition
matters, a translucent approach that protects plaintiff’s privacy leads to
optimal deterrence. This is because translucency encourages victims to
bring claims. Similarly, when the cost of false claims is high (and pattern
recognition matters), a translucent approach that partially protects defendant

53

AR-S and EM-S refer to the armed robber- and embezzler-storekeeper
examples, supra Part II; A-M refers to the consumer-manufacturer example, supra
Section I-A; X-Y refers to the sexual assault example, supra Part IV.
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privacy maximizes the social value of settlements.54 Disclosure of the
claim’s subject matter, and not its amount, reveals a pattern of wrongdoing
that reduces private discovery costs, but dampens plaintiff incentives to file
non-viable claims. In particular, these incentives are reduced because less
information is revealed about a defendant’s settlement behavior than in a
regime requiring transparency. Note that disclosure of the amount but not
the subject of the claim would reveal less about patterned wrongdoing and
more about settlement behavior. Disclosure of the number of claims, but not
their subject matter or dollar amount, would produce the same inferior
result.
Plaintiffs’ capacity to assess defendants’ exposure to liability, and thus
drive a bargain that properly deters defendants, is the driving force in the
argument for confidential settlement as deterrent. When that capacity is
high, victims have less need for disclosure of prior settlements. Law can
rely on settlements to deter wrongdoers, and law can enjoy lower
administrative costs. A heightened ability to assess wrongdoing is thus an
exception to the general result that where there is serial (or patterned)
wrongdoing, law should disfavor secret settlements.55 Still, as discussed in
Part II, this optimistic conclusion requires that there be at least one victim
who perceives the number of other victims and the extent of their injuries.
Such a victim can extract a settlement that sufficiently deters the defendant.
In the absence of an effective plaintiff of this sort, a wrongdoer is properly
deterred only by multiple claims or a class action, so that sunshine (on
settlements) is desirable. Again, if the plaintiffs value privacy, translucency
may be superior to transparency.
In addition to patterns and privacy, a third and final parameter is
adjudication accuracy. When facts are difficult to discern, administrative
costs are high.56 In turn, (1) deterrence is weak because parties are uncertain
of legal outcomes; (2) plaintiffs can be chilled by high discovery costs –
unless they perceive that defendants’ costs are even greater; and (3) false
claims will rise as plaintiffs play the litigation lottery, though the increase is
offset somewhat by burdens and standards of proof. Unsurprisingly, this is
54

We recognize that some case types may require an assumption that victim
privacy is more socially valuable than injurer privacy. This is particularly so when
the social benefits of deterrence exceed the social costs of false claims. The
opposite is true when the competing quantities of both statements are reversed.
55
While a more general approach would dispose of pattern recognition
altogether and consider plaintiffs’ ability to assess exposure in its stead, we think
that the specificity gained through the discussion of patterns is analytically
valuable. See supra Section I-B.
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the setting where private settlement is most beneficial, as it can provide
deterrence at lower cost than litigation, and in situations where litigation
may fail to provide any deterrence at all. In turn, permissive confidentiality
encourages these desirable settlements. A legal system that is accurate and
efficient has little need for settlements, but as costs and inaccuracy rise,
private settlement is attractive – and especially so once it is understood that
the settling plaintiff can extract value in return for confidentiality, and thus
contribute to law’s deterrence goal.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by asking whether there is a problem with
confidential settlements of civil lawsuits. The answer is nuanced – as it is
for criminal, and sexual assault cases – because each type of disclosure
regime generates its own mix of identifiable benefits and costs. The plain
observation that settlements reduce the cost of administering law provides a
default regime of permissible secrecy, and has surely encouraged courts to
favor settlement and therefore to allow confidentiality at the expense of
third parties. Disclosure is most important when there is a pattern of
wrongdoing that a settling plaintiff cannot assess. When a plaintiff’s
incentive to file is low and a false claimant’s incentive to file is high,
disclosure must be tempered with privacy protections that encourage
legitimate claims and discourage false ones. On the other hand, deterrence
may benefit from secrecy when the facts of a dispute are obscure and courts
cannot adjudicate claims accurately.
The title of this Article is misleading, as it describes the back half of our
discussion, aimed at readers who reject our first claim, that confidential
settlements may be desirable because the price of confidentiality is a
payment that promotes law’s deterrence goals. In many cases, including
most that involve tortfeasors and their victims (whether in a potential largescale tort or in a two-party road accident), the strong intuition in favor of –
and legislated sunshine laws requiring – disclosure aimed to benefit third
parties is likely wrong. Lawyers like disclosure and the signals that it
provides, but lawyers are professionally inclined to underestimate the costs
and distaste most people associate with trials. They are also inclined to
think that legal procedures get at the truth, while laypeople are often fearful
56

Where laws are difficult to discern and adjudication may, over time, produce
accurate judgment, parties are likely to choose litigation. George Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 65
(1977).
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of legal errors, and thus eager to settle cases in ways that will bring on few
others.
This Article has not insisted that by paying a premium for confidential
settlements, wrongdoers are optimally deterred. Indeed, it has explained
why the deterrence is imperfect. But even this imperfect deterrence is
enough to suggest that law ought to be nudged away from transparency and
toward translucency. This is clearest in civil cases where law and judicial
behavior reflect a strong policy in favor of settlement. In criminal and
university discipline cases, where there is no such policy, where a pattern of
misbehavior might be hidden by confidentiality, and where the law might
have reason for its remedies and not want private parties to convert them to
cash, there are few cases where confidential settlement is warranted.
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